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Intel Insider Trading
Uploaded by Don Jan 04, 2018 at 07:17PM EST
Origin Entry: Meltdown and Spectre
File type: png
Resolution: (3542px x 3270px)
File size: 258 KB
![From Date Subject Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Linus Torvalds <> Wed, 3 Jan 2018 15:51:35-0800 On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org wrote: > This is a fix for Variant 2 in ading-pr ed-memor ide > Any speculative indirect calls in the kernel can be tricked to execute any kernel code, which may allow side channel » attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data Why is this all done without any configuration options? A *competent* CPU engineer would fix this by making sure speculation doesn't happen across protection domains. Maybe even a L1 I$ that is keyed by CPL. I think somebody inside of Intel needs to really take a long hard look at their CPU's, and actually admit that they have issues instead of writing PR blurbs that say that everything works as designed .. and that really means that all these mitigation patches should be written with "not all CPU's are crap" in mind Or is Intel basically saying "we are committed to selling you s--- forever and ever, and never fixing anything"? Because if that's the case, maybe we should start looking towards the ARM64 people more Please talk to management. Because I really see exactly two possibibilities: Intel never intends to fix anything OR - these workarounds should have a way to disable them. Which of the two is it? Linus Last update: 2018-01-04 00:53 [W:0.021 /U:1.412 seconds] ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital Ocean idvertise on this site](https://i.kym-cdn.com/photos/images/list/001/329/312/a5f.png "Linus Torvalds is angry")
Uploaded by Don Jan 04, 2018 at 07:17PM EST
Origin Entry: Meltdown and Spectre
File type: png
Resolution: (3542px x 3270px)
File size: 258 KB
